Module 21: The Seventh Amendment

The Text

"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

U.S. Const. amend. VII (ratified December 15, 1791)¹

Fifty words, one sentence, two commands. The first clause says a jury right "shall be preserved" in a certain class of cases. The second, usually called the Reexamination Clause, says what a judge may do with a jury's findings once the jury has made them. Courts and scholars treat the two as separate guarantees. Justice Story wrote in 1830 that the second clause was "still more important" than the first and should be read "as a substantial and independent clause."²

Three words carry most of the weight. "Preserved" tells you the Amendment did not create a new right: it froze an old one. "Suits at common law" tells you which old right, and it separates the jury side of English law from the equity and admiralty side. And "Court of the United States" tells you the Amendment speaks to federal courts only. Idaho's district courts are not "Courts of the United States," a point that matters for the Idaho section below.

The dollar figure also matters, though less than it once did. The text still says twenty dollars. No amendment has changed it, and nobody has told the Court to read it as a modern sum. In June 2026 the Supreme Court cited the figure while rejecting an argument that reputational harm alone triggers a jury, writing that the carriers' theory was "hard to square with the text of the Seventh Amendment, which applies only to suits 'where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.'"³

The Amendment covers civil cases only. Criminal jury rights live in Article III, section 2, and in the Sixth Amendment (Module 20 covers them). Grand juries live in the Fifth (Module 19). That division is easy to miss, because ordinary speech uses "jury trial" for all of them.

Why the Civil Jury Mattered: English Roots and Colonial Grievances

Blackstone, in the third volume of his Commentaries (1768), spent pages on the civil jury. He wrote that the jury "ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law," and that it is "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals."⁴ His reason was practical. A jury of neighbors could weigh witnesses face to face, and a judge, whom the Crown paid and could remove, was not the only voice in the room.

American colonists took that view with them and then had reasons of their own to hold it. In October 1765 the Stamp Act Congress, meeting in New York, resolved "that trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies." The same resolutions complained that Parliament had extended "the jurisdiction of the courts of Admiralty beyond its ancient limits."⁵ The complaint was concrete. Admiralty courts, like equity courts, sat without juries, so every kind of case moved into them was a case taken away from a jury.²

The Declaration of Independence put the grievance in its list against the King: "For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury."⁶ Once the colonies became states, they wrote the jury into their own founding papers. Virginia's Declaration of Rights (June 12, 1776) said that "in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred." Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution said "Trials shall be by jury as heretofore" and told the legislature to guard against "corruption or partiality in the choice, return, or appointment of juries." New Jersey's said the "inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever."⁷⁸⁹

Thomas Jefferson, writing from Paris in July 1789 to a French correspondent who had asked about juries, gave the most compact statement of what Americans thought the civil jury did. The people, he said, were unqualified to run the executive or to make the laws, so they chose those who did. They were also unqualified to judge questions of law, "but they are very capable of judging questions of fact." He added that permanent judges "acquire an Esprit de corps," that they can be "misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party," and that "the opinion of 12 honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right."¹⁰ That is a theory of government as much as a theory of procedure. It treats the jury as a branch of popular participation, which is why the Anti-Federalists fought for it.

Early American judges also gave juries a larger role than modern judges do. In Georgia v. Brailsford (1794), Chief Justice John Jay told a jury hearing a civil case at the Supreme Court itself that on questions of fact the jury decides, on questions of law the court decides, but "you have, nevertheless, a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy."¹¹ Later courts retired that practice, and no one cites it as current law. It shows how much weight the founding generation put on the jury as a check.

Philadelphia, September 1787: A Clause That Lost Ten to Zero

The Constitution as drafted over the summer of 1787 said, in Article III, section 2, that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury." It said nothing about civil cases.¹²

The omission got noticed on September 12, five days before the delegates signed. Madison's notes record that Hugh Williamson of North Carolina "observed to the House that no provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it." Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts answered that "It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely trusted in this matter." Elbridge Gerry "urged the necessity of Juries to guard agst. corrupt Judges." George Mason agreed that jury cases could not be listed one by one. He said "A general principle laid down on this and some other points would be sufficient," and then he made the larger point: "He wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights."¹²

Gerry moved for a committee to prepare a bill of rights. Roger Sherman answered that the state declarations of rights "are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient." Mason replied that "The Laws of the U. S. are to be paramount to State Bills of Rights." The vote came out New Hampshire no, Massachusetts abstaining, and Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia all no. Ten states against, none for.¹²

Three days later, on September 15, Charles Pinckney and Gerry moved to add to Article III, section 2: "And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases." Gorham again: "The constitution of Juries is different in different States and the trial itself is usual in different cases in different States." Rufus King made the same objection, and General Pinckney thought such a clause "would be pregnant with embarrassments." Madison recorded that the motion "was disagreed to nem: con:", Latin shorthand for no one dissenting.¹³

The delegates were not hostile to juries. They were stuck on drafting. Each state ran civil juries a little differently, some states merged law and equity, and no one could write a sentence that fit thirteen systems. The Philadelphia debates show a convention that wanted to leave the problem to Congress and the states, and did not foresee how loudly the country would object.

The Ratification Fight and Madison's Draft

The Anti-Federalists made the missing civil jury one of their best arguments. The writer known as the Federal Farmer, in his fourth letter (October 12, 1787), called the jury a share in government for ordinary people: "It is essential in every free country, that common people should have a part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department." Offices of senator and judge, he argued, would be filled by "the few, the well born," who "are generally disposed, and very naturally too, to favour those of their own description." Jurors and representatives, in his phrase, were "the centinels and guardians of each other."¹⁴

A second argument was a point of logic. The Constitution guaranteed jury trial in criminal cases and said nothing on civil ones, so the silence, the argument ran, abolished the civil jury. James Wilson answered in the Pennsylvania convention on December 7, 1787, that "it is very improper to infer from hence that it was not meant to exist under this government." The legislature, he said, could set the mode of trial, and it "will not do wrong in an instance from which they can derive no advantage."¹⁵ Alexander Hamilton took up the same objection in Federalist No. 83. "Every man of discernment must at once perceive," he wrote, "the wide difference between silence and abolition." He also observed that "The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury," the one side regarding it "as a valuable safeguard to liberty," the other as "the very palladium of free government." What he would not do was defend a constitutional clause, because the task of "fashioning a provision in such a form, as not to express too little to answer the purpose, or too much to be advisable" looked, to him, too hard.¹⁶

The state conventions asked for the right to be written in. Virginia's list of amendments, adopted June 27, 1788, said "in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and to remain sacred and inviolable." New York asked that "the trial by jury, in the extent that it obtains by the common law of England, is one of the greatest securities to the rights of a free people, and ought to remain inviolate." North Carolina used nearly the same words as Virginia.¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹

When Madison introduced his amendments in the House on June 8, 1789, he put the civil jury at the end of a clause amending Article III: "In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." He also proposed a limit on appeals to the Supreme Court: "nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the principles of common law."²⁰ The ancestor of both clauses of the Seventh Amendment is in that single resolution.

A House committee shortened it to "In suits at common law, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," and the House adopted that version in August. The Constitution Annotated reports, citing the Senate Journal, that the Senate adopted the provision on September 7, 1789 after inserting a floor of twenty dollars.²¹ The enrolled resolution that Congress sent to the states on September 25, 1789 carried the final wording as "Article the ninth," and it was ratified as the Seventh Amendment on December 15, 1791.¹²² The Constitution Annotated also says "[i]t does not appear that the proposed amendment's text or meaning was debated during its passage."²¹ This lesson did not find a source explaining why the Senate chose twenty dollars.

"Suits at Common Law": Which Cases Get a Jury

Justice Joseph Story supplied the first working definition in Parsons v. Bedford (1830). The case came up from a federal court in Louisiana, whose civil-law procedure put the testimony in a record that an appeals court could re-weigh. Story wrote that the phrase "common law" in the Amendment "is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence," because in "courts of equity and admiralty, juries do not intervene." He did not limit the clause to causes of action that existed in 1791. "In a just sense," he wrote, "the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights."²

That sentence still governs. A century later the Court restated it: the right preserved is "the right which existed under the English common law when the amendment was adopted," and the Amendment "discloses a studied purpose to protect it from indirect impairment."²³ Two tests follow from Story's line, and the Court applies both. One looks at the claim: is it like a case English law courts heard before 1791? The other looks at the remedy: is it a kind of relief that only law courts gave?

New statutes, old categories

Congress writes new causes of action all the time. Does a jury come with them? The Court has said yes when the new claim sounds like an old legal one. In Curtis v. Loether (1974) a tenant sued for damages under the Fair Housing Act. Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that "the Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law," because the statutory claim "sounds basically in tort."²⁴ The same year, in Pernell v. Southall Realty, the Court held that a landlord's suit to evict a tenant under the District of Columbia code carried a jury right even though England had no exact twin of the statute, since the Amendment requires a jury "in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law."²⁵²¹

Later cases applied the same logic to a union member's back-pay claim (Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers v. Terry, 1990, damages for breach of the duty of fair representation) and to statutory damages under the Copyright Act (Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 1998, Justice Thomas writing for eight Justices that a jury must decide the amount as well).²⁶²⁷

Penalties belong to law courts

In Tull v. United States (1987) the government sued a real-estate developer for dumping fill on wetlands on Chincoteague Island, Virginia, and sought civil penalties of more than $22 million under the Clean Water Act, plus an injunction. The judge denied a jury, found liability, and entered a judgment of $325,000. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that the action "is clearly analogous to the 18th-century action in debt, and federal courts have rightly assumed that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial." The Court then split the job: the Amendment "required that petitioner's demand for a jury trial be granted to determine his liability, but ... the trial court and not the jury should determine the amount of penalty, if any."²⁸²¹

When law and equity meet in one case

Federal courts merged law and equity into one civil action in 1938, but kept the old dividing line for deciding who gets a jury. A plaintiff often asks for a mix, for example an injunction plus money. Two decisions by Justice Black settled the order of business. In Beacon Theatres v. Westover (1959), a declaratory-judgment claim and an antitrust counterclaim shared a question about competition between two theaters, and the trial judge meant to decide it alone first. The Supreme Court ordered a jury. "Only under the most imperative circumstances," it held, can "the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."²⁹ In Dairy Queen v. Wood (1962), a franchisor sued for an injunction and "an accounting" of money owed on a franchise contract. The Court looked past the word "accounting" to the money claim underneath and held that "the legal claims involved in the action must be determined prior to any final court determination of respondents' equitable claims."³⁰

The Court carried the idea to shareholder suits in Ross v. Bernhard (1970): in a derivative action, shareholders may demand a jury on the issues the corporation itself could have taken to a jury had it sued in its own name.³¹

Agencies, "Public Rights" and the Jarkesy Line

This is the part of Seventh Amendment law that changed most in the last three years, and the part where the rules are least settled. The question is whether Congress may send a penalty case to an agency's own in-house judge instead of to a federal court and a jury.

Atlas Roofing and the exception

In Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC (1977) the Court unanimously upheld the Occupational Safety and Health Act's scheme, under which an agency finds workplace violations and assesses civil penalties without a jury. The Court reasoned that "in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated," meaning cases where the government acts in its sovereign capacity to enforce rights Congress created by statute, "the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible."³²²¹ For decades agencies read that as wide room to assess penalties in house.

The Court narrowed it in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg (1989). A bankruptcy trustee sought to recover an allegedly fraudulent transfer from a person who had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy. Justice Brennan wrote that Congress may sometimes send a "public right" claim to a non-jury forum, "But it lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury." The Court treated the Seventh Amendment question and the Article III question as one: if a claim has to go to an Article III court, the Amendment gives a jury whenever the cause of action is legal in nature.³³²¹

SEC v. Jarkesy (2024)

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 let the SEC seek civil penalties for securities fraud before its own administrative law judges. In 2013 the SEC charged George Jarkesy, Jr., a hedge-fund manager, and his firm Patriot28, LLC. After an in-house proceeding the Commission levied a $300,000 civil penalty and imposed other relief. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order, and on June 27, 2024 the Supreme Court affirmed, 6 to 3. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for himself and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett.³⁴

The majority took the two tests in order. First, is the action legal in nature? The remedy "is the more important" factor, and a civil penalty that is "designed to punish or deter the wrongdoer" rather than "solely to 'restore the status quo'" is the kind of relief law courts gave. "In this case, the remedy is all but dispositive." The cause of action pointed the same way, because the antifraud provisions borrow from common-law fraud and the suit was "in the nature of" a common-law action. Second, did the public-rights exception rescue the SEC? The Court said no. The exception "has no textual basis in the Constitution," and the Court has "typically evaluated the legal basis for the assertion of the doctrine with care." The opinion read Atlas Roofing as resting on claims "unknown to the common law." It also recalled that the missing civil jury was perhaps the "most success[ful]" attack on the proposed Constitution, and that the Framers "promptly adopted the Seventh Amendment to fix that flaw."³⁴

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately to argue that the Seventh Amendment works together with Article III and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and he cited a report that the SEC won about 90 percent of its contested in-house proceedings against 69 percent of its cases in court. The majority said in a footnote that "As the concurrence shows, Atlas Roofing represents a departure from our legal traditions."³⁴ Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented, warning that Congress "has enacted more than 200 statutes authorizing dozens of agencies to impose civil penalties for violations of statutory obligations."³⁴

FCC v. AT&T (June 4, 2026)

The warning led to a flood of challenges. The most important of them reached the Supreme Court in 2026. The Federal Communications Commission had fined AT&T about $57 million and Verizon about $47 million for how they handled customer location data. The carriers paid, sought review in courts of appeals, and argued that the process denied them a jury. The Fifth Circuit agreed (AT&T v. FCC, 149 F.4th 491), while the Second Circuit rejected the same argument (Verizon v. FCC, 156 F.4th 86), and the D.C. Circuit also upheld the scheme in Sprint v. FCC.³

The Supreme Court heard argument on April 21, 2026 and decided on June 4, 2026, 8 to 1. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Amendment does not "prescribe at what stage" of a dispute the jury must come in. It requires only that "before legal rights and obligations are conclusively 'ascertained and determined,'" a party "has the chance to insist that a jury make the 'ultimate determination of issues of fact.'" FCC forfeiture orders do not bind anyone. The Commission cannot seize assets or garnish wages, nonpayment draws no penalty and no interest, and the agency may not use an unpaid order against a party. If the Justice Department wants the money, it must sue, and the statute makes that suit "a trial de novo." In the Court's words, "for the purpose of a §504 trial ... it is as if the Commission never found any facts at all," a trial that the Court called "the only means by which the Government can collect a penalty." In practical terms, no one has to pay before a jury has had the last word.³

The Court distinguished Jarkesy on exactly that ground: the SEC's penalties were "immediately enforceable," while the FCC's are not. It also rejected an "unconstitutional conditions" claim, on the theory that the Amendment applies only to "suits," and the only suit in the scheme is the Justice Department's enforcement action. Justice Thomas dissented. He agreed with the Court's Seventh Amendment reasoning, but he would have given the carriers a chance to proceed under it, since they had already paid more than $100 million on the belief that the orders bound them.³ A Congressional Research Service legal sidebar published eight days later said the decision "demonstrates a potential path" for Congress to give agencies penalty power consistent with the Amendment, and noted that one amicus brief had counted "at least eleven other federal statutes" that use a similar enforcement structure.³⁵

What is settled now: a binding in-house penalty for conduct that looks like a common-law wrong needs a jury (Jarkesy), while a non-binding agency finding followed by a jury trial de novo does not (AT&T). What is open: how courts will sort the many statutes that fall between those poles, how far Atlas Roofing survives, and which "public rights" count after Jarkesy. This lesson could not confirm any post-June 2026 lower-court application of the decision, and readers should search for new rulings before relying on it.

What Counts as a Jury: Size, Unanimity and Selection

The Amendment says "trial by jury" and does not say how many jurors, how they vote, or how they are picked. The Court has filled those gaps by asking what the common law meant in 1791, then by relaxing the answer where history looked accidental.

Twelve, then six

In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof (1899) a street-railway company was sued for $300 before a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, and the question was whether a jury sitting before that officer was the jury the Amendment preserves. Justice Gray said it was not. "Trial by jury," he wrote, is not "merely a trial by a jury of 12 men before an officer" who can swear them in and enter judgment, "but it is a trial by a jury of 12 men in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or the evidence." The Court still upheld the scheme, because either side could take the case to a court of record and get a full jury trial there. Hof is therefore also the case for the point, repeated in 2026, that the Amendment does not say at what stage the jury must come in.³⁶³ Through most of the twentieth century federal courts treated twelve as the number. Then Colgrove v. Battin (1973) upheld a District of Montana local rule that gave civil juries six members. Justice Brennan's opinion for a 5 to 4 Court said that "the number 12 is no more than a 'historical accident' and is 'wholly without significance except to mystics.'" Justice Marshall, dissenting with Justice Stewart, and Justice Douglas, dissenting with Justice Powell, disagreed.³⁷ Today Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 says a jury "must begin with at least 6 and no more than 12 members."³⁸

Unanimity

Unless the parties agree otherwise, the verdict in a federal civil case "must be unanimous," under Rule 48(b).³⁸ The Supreme Court said in 1916 that it was "so long and so conclusively settled that the 7th Amendment exacts a trial by jury according to the course of the common law, that is, by a unanimous verdict" that the point was not open to question. That is why the same case could allow a five-sixths verdict in a Minnesota state court while a federal court could not accept one.³⁹

Choosing jurors

Federal statute says litigants "entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community" and bars exclusion "on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." Each party in a civil case gets three peremptory challenges.⁴⁰⁴¹⁴² The Constitution adds its own limit. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (1991) a private defendant used two of its three strikes against Black prospective jurors in a personal-injury suit, and Justice Kennedy's opinion held that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors because of race.⁴³ J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) extended the rule to sex.⁴⁴

Binding effects

A jury verdict can have consequences beyond the case, and the Court has said that some of them do not offend the Amendment. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979), the SEC had won a judgment, after a bench trial, that a proxy statement was false. A shareholder then sued the same company for damages and asked the court to treat the falsity as already proven. The Court allowed that, over a dissent by Justice Rehnquist that quoted Blackstone, reasoning that "many procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury's historic domain have been found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment."⁴⁵

The Reexamination Clause: What Judges May Do to a Verdict

The second clause bars federal courts from re-examining a fact tried by a jury in a way the common law did not allow. Story's 1830 summary of the allowed ways is short: "The only modes known to the common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings."² A new trial gets a new jury. That keeps the facts with jurors.

Directing a verdict

A judge who finds the evidence legally insufficient may take the case from the jury. Galloway v. United States (1943) held that the practice does not violate the Amendment, in an opinion by Justice Rutledge that rejected the "argument from history" and noted that "the jury was not absolute master of fact in 1791." Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, dissented, calling the decision "a continuation of the gradual process of judicial erosion which in one hundred fifty years has slowly worn away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment."⁴⁶

Judgment after the verdict

In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1913) a jury found for the plaintiff, an appeals court decided the evidence did not support the verdict, and it ordered judgment for the defendant outright. The Supreme Court said the Reexamination Clause required a new trial instead.⁴⁷ In Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman (1935), the trial judge had reserved his ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict before sending the case to the jury, and the Court held that the judge could then enter judgment for the defendant under his reserved ruling. The difference was the reservation: "The verdict for the plaintiff was taken pending the court's rulings on the motions and subject to those rulings." Modern Rule 50 builds on that reasoning by requiring a motion for judgment as a matter of law before the case goes to the jury and allowing a renewed motion afterward.²³⁴⁸

Adjusting damages

Dimick v. Schiedt (1935) is the leading case. A Massachusetts jury awarded $500 for a highway injury caused by a car. The plaintiff moved for a new trial because the sum was inadequate, and the trial court ordered one unless the defendant agreed to raise the award to $1,500. The defendant agreed. The Supreme Court held that increasing a verdict this way (called additur) violated the Seventh Amendment, because English courts before 1791 did not raise a jury's damages. Justice Sutherland admitted that the cousin practice of remittitur, in which a judge cuts an excessive verdict unless the plaintiff accepts a lower sum, rested on thin English authority: "it therefore may be that, if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would be decided otherwise." But the practice had been followed for a century, so "we may assume that in a case involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine would not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day." The Court added that "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."⁴⁹

Reviewing size

In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities (1996) a journalist sued after a company lost some of his Central American slides. A jury awarded $450,000, and the Second Circuit ordered a new trial unless he accepted $100,000, applying a New York statute (CPLR 5501(c)) that asks whether an award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court held that a federal court sitting in diversity applies that state standard, that the trial judge makes the first call, and that a court of appeals reviews that call for abuse of discretion. It vacated the Second Circuit's judgment and sent the matter back to the district court. The Court also approved appellate review of excessive-verdict rulings, quoting Justice Stewart's earlier view that "nothing in the Seventh Amendment ... precludes appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a motion to set aside [a jury verdict] as excessive."⁵⁰

A related line of cases, not covered here, addresses punitive damages and due process. That analysis rests on the Fourteenth Amendment, not on the Seventh.

The Seventh Amendment and the States

The Bill of Rights began as a limit on the national government, and the Seventh Amendment never moved past that. In Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Bombolis (1916) a railroad objected that Minnesota's rule letting five-sixths of a civil jury return a verdict after twelve hours of deliberation violated the Seventh Amendment. Chief Justice White answered that the first ten Amendments, "including, of course, the 7th, are not concerned with state action, and deal only with Federal action." He added that if the Amendment applied, the verdict "would be void," since the Court had long held that the Amendment demanded a unanimous verdict.³⁹ The Court has also left the Fourteenth Amendment door shut. Writing in 1974 for the Court, Justice Marshall noted that "The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment."²⁴ The Constitution Annotated still says the Supreme Court has not applied the Amendment to the states, and adds that "[m]ost state constitutions, however, include this right."²¹

So each state runs its civil juries under its own constitution. Idaho, covered below, accepts a three-fourths verdict, uses six-member juries in lower-court cases, and caps noneconomic damages. A rule that would fail in federal court can be valid in a state court that is not bound by the Seventh Amendment. It is still subject to the state's own constitution, and that is where the arguments happen.

What Is Still Argued

History or function

The Court's main tests look backward: find the 1791 analogue, then ask whether the remedy was legal. In Markman v. Westview Instruments (1996), a unanimous Court held that the judge, not the jury, construes the words of a patent claim, and said that when there is no clear historical answer a court may ask whether "as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question."⁵¹²¹ Defenders of the historical test say it keeps judges from deciding for themselves when juries are useful. The other side argues that 1791 gives no answer to questions about statutes and procedures that did not exist then, and Markman shows the Court itself sometimes reaches for a functional test.

How much room agencies get

Jarkesy and AT&T pull in two directions, and the fight over Atlas Roofing is unfinished. The Gorsuch concurrence argues that the public-rights category is narrow and that Atlas Roofing departed from tradition. The Sotomayor dissent counts more than 200 statutes at risk. The June 2026 opinion gave Congress a drafting route, but it also left open what happens when an agency order is binding in some respects and not in others.³⁴³

Whether juries still matter

Fewer civil cases reach any trial. In the twelve months ending September 30, 2025, federal district courts closed 407,379 civil cases. Of those, 1,681 ended during or after a trial, 1,182 of them jury trials and 499 bench trials, so 0.4 percent of cases reached trial. In fiscal 1990, 9,263 civil cases ended during or after trial (4,783 jury and 4,480 nonjury), which was 4.3 percent.⁵² The figures do not say why trials fell. Some of the drop is settlement and summary judgment, and some is arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a written arbitration clause in a contract involving commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," and a dispute covered by one goes to an arbitrator instead of a jury.⁵³ Even without arbitration the right can be lost: Rule 38(d) says a party "waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed."⁵⁴

Damage caps

The Idaho Supreme Court held in 2000 that a statutory cap on noneconomic damages does not infringe the state's jury guarantee, because the jury still finds the facts and the cap is applied afterward. Other state courts have gone both ways. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld that state's cap in 2020 over a dissent that would have held it unconstitutional under the jury right.⁵⁵⁵⁶ Because the Seventh Amendment does not bind states, these disputes rest on state constitutions.

Myths and Misreadings

Landmark Cases

The cases below run from 1830 to 2026. Several are described in the sections above, and the rest are included because courts still cite them for the law/equity line, jury size or the Reexamination Clause.

The Idaho Connection

Idaho's constitution has its own jury clause, and it differs from the Seventh Amendment in ways that matter in practice. Article I, section 7 reads in part: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict."⁵⁹ The same section lets parties waive a civil jury "by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law," says that a civil jury "may consist of twelve or of any number less than twelve upon which the parties may agree in open court," and sets a ceiling: in misdemeanor cases and in civil actions "within the jurisdiction of any court inferior to the district court," the jury "shall consist of not more than six."⁵⁹

Put those clauses beside the federal rules described earlier. A federal civil jury has between 6 and 12 members and, absent a stipulation, must be unanimous.³⁸ An Idaho civil jury can return a verdict when nine of twelve agree, or five of six, and in lower-court cases the panel is capped at six.⁵⁹ Because the Seventh Amendment binds only federal courts, neither Idaho rule is a federal problem. Both are valid in state court as long as they satisfy the Idaho clause.³⁹

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure turn the constitutional text into steps. Rule 38(a) preserves "the right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as provided by a statute of the state of Idaho." Rule 38(b) lets a party demand a jury by serving a written demand "no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served," and the demand must say whether the party "will stipulate to a jury of less than 12 persons, but at least 6." Rule 38(d) provides that "A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed."⁶⁰ Rule 47(l) repeats the three-fourths rule and says that in civil actions that may be assigned to the magistrate division "the jury must consist of not more than 6." The same subsection states that "The cost of a jury may not be taxed as costs to any party in any civil action."⁶¹

Jurors themselves have statutory protection. Idaho Code section 2-218 bars an employer from depriving a worker of employment, or threatening or coercing the worker, "because the employee receives a summons, responds thereto, serves as a juror, or attends court for prospective jury service." An employer who does so is guilty of criminal contempt and may be fined up to $300, and the employee may sue within 60 days for treble the lost wages and for reinstatement.⁶² Section 2-215 sets juror pay by county: the statute starts at $5 for each half-day and lets county commissioners set a higher rate up to $25, with higher figures for jurors who travel more than 30 miles and for long trials.⁶³ The federal counterpart, 28 U.S.C. section 1875, protects federal jurors' employment.⁶⁴

The Idaho clause matters most in the fight over damage caps. Idaho Code section 6-1603 limits noneconomic damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases to $250,000, adjusted every July 1 by the percentage change in the average annual wage set by the Industrial Commission. The statute says the jury "shall not be informed of the limitation," and the cap does not apply to causes of action "arising out of willful or reckless misconduct" or to acts the trier of fact finds "beyond a reasonable doubt would constitute a felony."⁶⁵ The Industrial Commission's table, which it labels "Unofficial, provided as a courtesy," lists the figure rising from $277,039.85 on July 1, 2007 to $538,425.04 effective July 1, 2026.⁶⁶ In Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, decided June 29, 2000, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the cap does not violate the jury right in article I, section 7.⁵⁵ This lesson could not confirm whether a later Idaho decision has revisited the question.

Idaho's text is shorter on one point. The Idaho clause says nothing like the Reexamination Clause. This lesson did not locate an Idaho case that reads the state clause to limit remittitur or additur the way Dimick limits additur in federal court, and it makes no claim about how Idaho courts handle either practice. Readers who need that answer should search Idaho decisions on motions for a new trial directly.

Where This Shows Up for Officials, Reporters and Citizens

The juror whose boss is unhappy

Dana Whitlow gets a jury summons for a civil trial and tells her supervisor at a hardware warehouse that she needs Monday through Wednesday. He tells her to find a way out of it or look for other work. Idaho Code section 2-218 makes that threat a crime. If he fires her, she has 60 days to sue for treble lost wages and reinstatement.⁶² If the case were in federal court, 28 U.S.C. section 1875 would do similar work.⁶⁴

The 14-day clock

Marcus Tell sues a roofing contractor in magistrate court and wants a jury. Idaho Rule 38(b) gives him until 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served to serve and file a written demand, and the demand has to say whether he will accept a jury of fewer than 12. If he lets the date pass, Rule 38(d) treats the jury as waived.⁶⁰ A reporter covering the case should note which side demanded a jury and when, because a bench trial and a jury trial of the same dispute look very different on the court calendar.

The clause nobody read

Nia Brandt signed up for a streaming app and clicked past a long agreement. Years later she sues over a billing practice and learns the agreement sends disputes to an arbitrator. The Federal Arbitration Act makes a written arbitration clause in a contract involving commerce "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."⁵³ The Seventh Amendment does not stop that clause from displacing a jury, because a party can agree to give up the right. A citizen deciding whether to sign should know that the jury right is the thing being traded.

The verdict and the judgment

A jury in a personal injury case writes $900,000 on the line for pain and suffering. Reporter Priya Nand files a story with that figure in the headline. Under Idaho Code section 6-1603, the jury "shall not be informed" of the cap, and the judgment entered for noneconomic damages cannot exceed the statutory figure unless an exception applies.⁶⁵ For injuries claimed in 2026, the Industrial Commission's table lists $538,425.04 effective July 1, 2026.⁶⁶ A careful story gives the verdict, then says the judgment may come out lower. This lesson could not confirm which July 1 figure governs a claim that arose in an earlier year, and the statute's text does not settle it.

The agency notice

Harlan Voss runs a freight company and receives a notice from a federal regulator proposing a penalty. The key question after Jarkesy and FCC v. AT&T is whether the order binds him on its own. If the agency can enforce the penalty without suing, Jarkesy supports a jury demand when the claim resembles a common-law wrong. If paying is optional and the government must go to court and win a trial de novo before collecting, the 2026 decision says the Amendment is satisfied.³⁴³ Which category a given statute falls into is the open question, and a reporter explaining such a notice to readers should quote the statute's enforcement language rather than guess.

The county that sets juror pay

Commissioner Evan Brandt's board is asked to raise daily juror pay. Under section 2-215 the statute sets a floor and a ceiling, and the board's resolution picks the rate between them.⁶³ A clerk who reads the statute aloud at the meeting gives the public an accurate account of what the board can and cannot do.

Related Modules

Related lessons: The First Amendment (Module 7); Search, Due Process and Fair Trials (Module 9, the overview of these rights); The Fifth Amendment (Module 19, grand juries and due process); The Sixth Amendment (Module 20, the criminal jury); The Eighth Amendment (Module 22, excessive fines); Article III: The Courts (Module 4); Federalism and the States (Module 5, why the Seventh does not bind states).

Sources & Further Reading

Primary Sources

• National Archives, The Bill of Rights: A Transcription (enrolled resolution of September 25, 1789)
• Avalon Project, Madison's Notes of the Federal Convention, September 12, 1787
• Avalon Project, Madison's Notes of the Federal Convention, September 15, 1787
• Avalon Project, Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, October 19, 1765
• National Archives, Declaration of Independence: A Transcription
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 2: Blackstone, Commentaries
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 3: Virginia Declaration of Rights, section 11
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 4: Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, section 25
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 5: New Jersey Constitution of 1776, article 22
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 7: Federal Farmer, no. 4
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 9: Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention debate
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 12: Federalist no. 83
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 13: Jefferson to the Abbe Arnoux, July 19, 1789
• The Founders' Constitution, Amendment VII, Document 14: Georgia v. Brailsford (1794)
• The Founders' Constitution, Bill of Rights, Document 11: House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8 to August 1789)
• The Founders' Constitution, Bill of Rights, Document 9: Virginia Ratifying Convention, proposed amendments
• The Founders' Constitution, Bill of Rights, Document 8: New York ratification
• The Founders' Constitution, Bill of Rights, Document 10: North Carolina Ratifying Convention
• 28 U.S.C. section 1861, Declaration of policy
• 28 U.S.C. section 1862, Discrimination prohibited
• 28 U.S.C. section 1870, Challenges
• 28 U.S.C. section 1875, Protection of jurors' employment
• 9 U.S.C. section 2, Validity of agreements to arbitrate
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, Right to a Jury Trial
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48, Number of Jurors; Verdict
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, Judgment as a Matter of Law
• Idaho Constitution, article I, section 7
• Idaho Code section 6-1603, Limitation on noneconomic damages
• Idaho Code section 2-215, Mileage and per diem of jurors
• Idaho Code section 2-218, Employer prohibited from penalizing employee for jury service
• Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38, Jury Trial
• Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Jurors
• Idaho Industrial Commission, non-economic damages caps table effective July 1, 2026 (labeled unofficial)
• Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table 4.10 (2025)
• Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table 4.12 (2024)

Opinions

• Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830)
• Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897)
• Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899)
• Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913)
• Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916)
• Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)
• Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)
• Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943)
• Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958)
• Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)
• Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962)
• Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)
• Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)
• Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)
• Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974)
• Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977)
• Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)
• Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)
• Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)
• Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990)
• Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
• J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
• Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
• Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996)
• Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998)
• SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024)
• FCC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 25-406 (June 4, 2026)
• Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000) (FindLaw copy)

Secondary Sources and Further Reading

• Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, 2022 edition (GPO)
• Congressional Research Service, FCC v. AT&T: Supreme Court Rejects Seventh Amendment Challenge to FCC Forfeiture Penalties (LSB11440, June 12, 2026)
• Federalist Society, State Court Docket Watch: McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC

Footnotes

1. National Archives, The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript. The Seventh Amendment text is quoted from the enrolled joint resolution of September 25, 1789; the page states that ten of the twelve proposed articles were ratified on December 15, 1791.
2. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) (Story, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/28/433. The quotations "still more important" and "a substantial and independent clause," and the reading of "common law" against equity and admiralty, are from the opinion text.
3. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 25-406 (U.S. June 4, 2026), consolidated with No. 25-567; argued April 21, 2026; Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by seven Justices; Thomas, J., dissenting. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/25-406. All quotations from the decision are from the slip opinion text posted there; this lesson could not confirm the U.S. Reports citation.
4. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 3, ch. 23 (1768), reprinted in The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 2, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs2.html. Both quotations are from the text there.
5. Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, October 19, 1765, Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolu65.asp. The meeting was held in New York; both quotations are from the resolutions.
6. National Archives, Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript. The jury grievance is in the list of charges against the King.
7. Virginia Declaration of Rights, sec. 11 (June 12, 1776), The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 3, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs3.html.
8. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 25, The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 4, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs4.html. The "corruption or partiality" language is from this section.
9. New Jersey Constitution of 1776, art. 22, The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 5, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs5.html. The "inestimable right" language is from this article.
10. Thomas Jefferson to the Abbe Arnoux, July 19, 1789, Papers 15:282-83, reprinted in The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 13, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs13.html.
11. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794) (Jay, C.J., charging the jury), The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 14, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs14.html.
12. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention, September 12, 1787, Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_912.asp.
13. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention, September 15, 1787, Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_915.asp. The Gorham and King objections, the Pinckney remark and the "nem: con:" record are quoted from Madison's notes.
14. Federal Farmer, no. 4 (October 12, 1787), in Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist 2.8.53-55, reprinted in The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 7, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs7.html.
15. Debate in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, December 7 and 11, 1787 (James Wilson), Elliot 2:488-89, 515-19, The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 9, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs9.html.
16. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist no. 83 (May 28, 1788), The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Amendment VII, Document 12, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendVIIs12.html.
17. Virginia Ratifying Convention, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution (June 27, 1788), Elliot 3:657-61, The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Bill of Rights, Document 9, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss9.html.
18. New York Ratification of the Constitution (July 26, 1788), Elliot 1:327-31, The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Bill of Rights, Document 8, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss8.html.
19. North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Declaration of Rights and Other Amendments (August 1, 1788), Elliot 4:242-46, 248-49, The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Bill of Rights, Document 10, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss10.html.
20. House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution, June 8, July 21, Aug. 13, 1789, Annals of Congress, reprinted in The Founders' Constitution, vol. 5, Bill of Rights, Document 11, https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html. Madison's resolution and the later committee text are quoted from this document.
21. The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 117-12 (2022 ed.), Amendment 7 historical note, citing the Annals of Congress, the Senate Journal and 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1150 (1971), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2022/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2022.pdf. The note's printed date for the House adoption reads "August 18, 1787," an evident typo for 1789, so this lesson does not rely on that date. This lesson read the 2022 edition; the live Constitution Annotated at congress.gov could not be opened.
22. National Archives, The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript. The enrolled resolution of September 25, 1789 sets out the Seventh Amendment as "Article the ninth."
23. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/295/654. Quotations are from the opinion text.
24. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/415/189.
25. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/416/363.
26. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/494/558.
27. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (Thomas, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/523/340.
28. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/481/412. Quotations are from the opinion text.
29. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/359/500.
30. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/369/469.
31. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/396/531.
32. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/430/442.
33. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/492/33.
34. SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), decided June 27, 2024 (6 to 3; Roberts, C.J., for the Court; Gorsuch, J., concurring; Sotomayor, J., dissenting), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/22-859.
35. Congressional Research Service, FCC v. AT&T: Supreme Court Rejects Seventh Amendment Challenge to FCC Forfeiture Penalties, Legal Sidebar LSB11440 (June 12, 2026), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/LSB11440.html. The live congress.gov copy could not be opened; this lesson read the republished text.
36. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/174/1.
37. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/413/149. The "historical accident" quotation and the 5 to 4 division are from the opinion text.
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) and (b), https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_48.
39. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/241/211.
40. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1861, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1861.
41. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1862, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1862.
42. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1870, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1870.
43. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/500/614.
44. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/511/127.
45. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/439/322.
46. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/319/372.
47. Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/228/364.
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) and (b), https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_50.
49. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/293/474. The facts and the "utmost care" quotation are from the opinion text.
50. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/95-719.
51. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/517/370.
52. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table 4.10, "U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Terminated, by Action Taken," 12-month periods ending June 30, 1990, and September 30, 1995 through 2025, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/jff_4.10_0930.2025.pdf. Land condemnation cases are omitted from the table.
53. 9 U.S.C. sec. 2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/9/2.
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) and (d), https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_38.
55. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, Docket No. 26044, 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho June 29, 2000) (Trout, C.J.), https://caselaw.findlaw.com/id-supreme-court/1026221.html. This lesson could not confirm the Idaho Reports citation (reported secondarily as 134 Idaho 464).
56. McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2020), as summarized in Federalist Society, State Court Docket Watch (Nov. 3, 2020), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/state-court-docket-watch-mcclay-v-airport-management-services-llc. This lesson read the summary, not the opinion.
57. Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/165/593. The "substance of right" passage is from the opinion text.
58. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/356/525. The Court noted it was giving "no view" on the constitutional jury question and decided on federal practice.
59. Idaho Const. art. I, sec. 7, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect7/.
60. Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(a), (b) and (d), https://isc.idaho.gov/rules-procedure/print/ircp/38.
61. Idaho R. Civ. P. 47(l), https://isc.idaho.gov/rules-procedure/print/ircp/47.
62. Idaho Code sec. 2-218, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title2/T2CH2/SECT2-218/.
63. Idaho Code sec. 2-215, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title2/T2CH2/SECT2-215/.
64. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1875, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1875.
65. Idaho Code sec. 6-1603, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title6/T6CH16/SECT6-1603/.
66. Idaho Industrial Commission, "Calculation -- Non-economic Damages Caps" (marked "Unofficial, provided as a courtesy"), https://iic.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Benefits-Non-economic-caps-effective-07_01_26.pdf. The table lists the 2026 average weekly wage of $1,135.00 and a cap of $538,425.04 effective July 1, 2026.