Article II: The President

Article II creates the presidency in about a thousand words. It vests "the executive Power" in one person, sets up the Electoral College, lists qualifications, and gives the President a handful of named powers: commander in chief, pardons, treaties, appointments, recess appointments, the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and a final section on impeachment.

Presidents and Congress have argued over these words since 1789. But arguments between the branches do not always become lawsuits. Many questions were settled by practice, by votes in Congress, or by elections. That is why so many Article II firsts arrived late, and why some never arrived. This lesson goes clause by clause, tells the story of the earliest case we could verify, and shows where the law stands now, including a major removal power ruling from June 2026.

Section 1: The Vesting Clause and the Electoral College

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (National Archives transcription)

The vesting sentence is the source of arguments about "inherent" presidential power. It is usually tested alongside other clauses, as in the removal and steel seizure cases below.

McPherson v. Blacker (1892): how states choose electors

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 (National Archives transcription, excerpt)

In 1891 Michigan changed how it picked presidential electors, choosing most of them by congressional district instead of statewide. Nominees for elector sued Michigan's Secretary of State, Robert Blacker, arguing that the law violated Article II and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), decided October 17, 1892, Chief Justice Melville Fuller held that the state legislature has the power to direct how electors are appointed: by the legislature itself, by districts, or by a statewide ticket. It is the earliest major Supreme Court ruling on the Electors Clause that we found.

What came after: Chiafalo v. Washington (2020)

Three Washington electors voted for Colin Powell in 2016 and were fined $1,000 each. In Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), decided July 6, 2020, Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the Court that a state's power to appoint electors includes the power to require a pledge and punish a "faithless" elector. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, relying on the Tenth Amendment instead. The 1952 case Ray v. Blair, about party pledges, is covered with the Twelfth Amendment in Lesson 10.

Qualifications: a clause without a first case

Article II requires that the President be "a natural born Citizen," at least thirty-five years old, and fourteen years a resident. We found no Supreme Court decision defining "natural born Citizen" for presidential eligibility. If someone tells you the Court has settled the meaning of the phrase, ask for the citation.

Removal: Myers, Humphrey's Executor and Slaughter

Article II says nothing directly about firing officials. The First Congress debated the question in 1789, and the House voted 34 to 20 on removal language, a vote Chief Justice Taft would later cite. Earlier still, Marbury v. Madison (1803) touched on the question when it said that Marbury, once appointed to a fixed term as justice of the peace, had a legal right to his commission. But the first Supreme Court case to squarely decide the President's removal power came more than a century later. As Chief Justice Taft put it in that case, the Court had "studiously avoided deciding the issue until it was presented in such a way that it could not be avoided."

Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935)

Nine years later the Court drew a line. President Hoover had appointed William E. Humphrey to the Federal Trade Commission for a seven-year term. President Franklin Roosevelt asked him to resign, and when he refused, removed him on October 7, 1933. The FTC Act allowed removal only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Humphrey died in 1934 and his estate sued for his salary. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), decided May 27, 1935, Justice George Sutherland wrote that the removal limits were valid because the Commission performed quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial work. The Court limited Myers to purely executive officers. That ruling became the legal basis for "independent agencies."

What came after: Trump v. Slaughter (2026)

In March 2025 the President removed FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without citing any of the statutory grounds. She sued, and a district court ordered her reinstated. The Supreme Court stayed that order and took the case. On June 29, 2026, in Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332 (see the Supreme Court docket), Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for a 6 to 3 Court (Justice Thomas joined all but one part, and Justice Gorsuch also concurred) that the FTC's removal protections violate the separation of powers, and the Court overruled Humphrey's Executor. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson. According to a Congressional Research Service legal sidebar, the Court treated the Federal Reserve as outside its decision and left some other removal questions open. Because this ruling is new, check the official opinion and later cases before you rely on its exact reach.

Section 2: The Pardon Power

he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 (National Archives transcription, excerpt)

United States v. Wilson (1833): the man who refused a pardon

George Wilson and James Porter were convicted in Pennsylvania of robbing the mail and endangering the life of the carrier. Both were sentenced to death, and Porter was executed. On June 14, 1830, President Andrew Jackson pardoned Wilson of that crime. When the court asked Wilson whether he wanted to use the pardon, he said he did not. In United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall held that a court cannot take notice of a pardon unless it is brought before the court by plea, motion or otherwise. Marshall described a pardon as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws." It is the earliest Supreme Court pardon case we found.

Ex parte Garland (1867): Congress cannot undo a pardon

Augustus Garland of Arkansas had served in the Confederate Congress and received a full presidential pardon in July 1865. A federal law required lawyers to swear they had never supported the rebellion. In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, decided in 1867, Justice Stephen Field wrote for a 5 to 4 Court that the pardon released Garland from the penalties of his offense, and that "This power of the President is not subject to legislative control." The case is also a bill of attainder landmark (Lesson 04).

Section 2: Commander in Chief

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 (National Archives transcription, excerpt)

An early sign of deference came in Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). Jacob Mott, a New York militia private, refused to report when the militia was called into federal service in the War of 1812. Justice Joseph Story wrote that "The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President." That case turned on the militia statute Congress passed under Article I, so it is not a pure commander in chief case.

The Prize Cases (1863): war without a declaration

In April 1861, before Congress met, President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports. Union ships captured merchant vessels, including the Amy Warwick, the Crenshaw, the Hiawatha and the Brilliante, and lower courts condemned them as prizes. The owners argued that only Congress could start a war. In The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, decided March 10, 1863, Justice Robert Grier wrote for a 5 to 4 majority that a civil war existed without a formal declaration and that the President could respond with a blockade. He wrote that in the case of invasion, "the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force." Justice Samuel Nelson dissented, joined by Chief Justice Taney and Justices John Catron and Nathan Clifford, arguing that no war existed in law until Congress acted on July 13, 1861. It is the earliest major Supreme Court ruling on the President's power to use military force without a declaration that we found.

What came after: Youngstown (1952)

Facing a planned nationwide steel strike in April 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10340 to seize most of the nation's steel mills. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), decided June 2, 1952, Justice Hugo Black wrote for a 6 to 3 Court that the seizure was lawmaking, a power the Constitution gives to Congress. Chief Justice Fred Vinson dissented, joined by Justices Stanley Reed and Sherman Minton. Justice Robert Jackson's concurrence, which sorts presidential power into three categories based on whether Congress has approved, been silent or opposed, is the framework courts use most today.

Section 2: Appointments and Recess Appointments

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 (National Archives transcription)

Most appointments fights are settled in the Senate. A key modern Appointments Clause case is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), decided January 30, 1976 in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Congress had let the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate appoint most voting members of the new Federal Election Commission. The Court held that a body exercising enforcement and rulemaking power must be appointed under Article II, so the Commission as structured could not use those powers.

NLRB v. Noel Canning (2014): a first after two centuries

In January 2012 President Obama made recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board during a three-day break between the Senate's pro forma sessions. The company Noel Canning challenged a later NLRB order. In NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), decided June 26, 2014, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for five Justices that the Senate is in session when it says it is, as long as it can conduct business under its own rules, and that a recess of less than ten days is presumptively too short. The appointments were invalid. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred only in the judgment. Breyer's opinion states plainly: "We have not previously interpreted the Clause." That makes Noel Canning a true first, confirmed by the Court itself.

Section 3: Take Care

he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3 (National Archives transcription, excerpt)

Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes (1838)

Congress passed an 1836 act directing the Postmaster General to credit mail contractors, including William B. Stokes, with whatever sum the Solicitor of the Treasury found they were owed. Postmaster General Amos Kendall credited only part of it. A court ordered him to pay. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), Justice Smith Thompson wrote that the duty was ministerial, so a court could compel it. The Court rejected the argument that the duty to see the laws faithfully executed "implies a power to forbid their execution." It is the earliest Supreme Court case we found applying the Take Care Clause.

Mississippi v. Johnson (1867): no injunction against the President

After the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, Mississippi asked the Supreme Court to stop President Andrew Johnson from enforcing them. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, decided April 15, 1867, the Court, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, held that it could not enjoin the President from carrying out an act of Congress said to be unconstitutional. Kendall involved a "ministerial" duty; the Reconstruction Acts called for duties the Court described as "purely executive and political."

Executive Privilege and Presidential Immunity

The Constitution never mentions executive privilege. As the Court said in United States v. Nixon, "Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality," as quoted in the Constitution Annotated.

United States v. Burr (1807): the first subpoena to a President

In 1807 Aaron Burr went on trial for treason in Richmond. He asked for a subpoena requiring President Thomas Jefferson to produce a letter from Gen. James Wilkinson. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit justice for Virginia, ruled that the President could be subpoenaed for a document relevant to the trial: United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). The Constitution Annotated notes that a separate Burr ruling, 25 F. Cas. 187, recognized that the President could still withhold specific information on grounds of privilege. Jefferson did not fully comply, treating the papers he handed over as a voluntary act rather than obedience to the court. Marshall delivered his principal opinion excluding most of the prosecution's evidence on August 31, 1807, and the jury acquitted Burr of treason the next day, September 1, 1807, according to the Federal Judicial Center's account of the trial.

United States v. Nixon (1974)

Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski subpoenaed tapes of President Nixon's conversations for the Watergate trial of seven indicted men. Nixon claimed executive privilege. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), decided July 24, 1974, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for an 8 to 0 Court (Justice William Rehnquist did not take part) that a generalized privilege "must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."

What came after: Trump v. United States (2024)

In Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), decided July 1, 2024, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a 6 to 3 Court that a former President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority, at least presumptive immunity for other official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, and Justice Jackson also wrote her own dissent. The opinion described the case as "the first criminal prosecution in our Nation's history of a former President" for actions taken while in office.

Section 4: Impeachment

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 4 (National Archives transcription)

Nixon v. United States (1993): the courts stay out

This Nixon was Walter Nixon, a federal district judge in Mississippi who was convicted of making false statements to a grand jury. The House impeached him. Under Senate Rule XI, a committee took the evidence and reported to the full Senate, which convicted and removed him. Nixon argued that the Senate's "sole Power to try all Impeachments" required the full Senate to hear the evidence. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), decided January 13, 1993, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the claim was a nonjusticiable political question: the Constitution commits impeachment trials to the Senate, and "try" offers no standard courts can manage. The judgment was unanimous, though Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and David Souter concurred only in the judgment. It is the leading Supreme Court case on impeachment trials, and its message is that impeachment is mostly for Congress, not the courts. Impeachment powers of the House and Senate also appear in Article I, covered in Lesson 02.

Summary table

Clause	First case	Year	What kind of first
Electors (II.1.2)	McPherson v. Blacker	1892	Earliest major Supreme Court ruling we found
Faithless electors	Chiafalo v. Washington	2020	Leading modern case
Qualifications (II.1.5)	None found	n/a	No Supreme Court ruling found
Removal power	Myers v. United States	1926	First to squarely decide; law struck down
Removal limits	Humphrey's Executor; Trump v. Slaughter	1935; 2026	Limits upheld; then overruled
Pardons (II.2.1)	United States v. Wilson	1833	Earliest Supreme Court pardon case we found
Pardon versus Congress	Ex parte Garland	1867	Earliest case we found holding Congress cannot limit a pardon's effect
Commander in chief (II.2.1)	The Prize Cases	1863	Earliest major ruling on force without a declaration we found
Appointments (II.2.2)	Buckley v. Valeo	1976	Key modern case (earliest not confirmed)
Recess appointments (II.2.3)	NLRB v. Noel Canning	2014	First interpretation, per the Court
Take care (II.3)	Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes	1838	Earliest case applying it we found
Executive privilege	United States v. Burr; United States v. Nixon	1807; 1974	First subpoena ruling (circuit); first Supreme Court ruling
Impeachment (II.4)	Nixon v. United States	1993	Leading case; political question