Article I, Sections 1 to 7: the Legislative Power, House, Senate and Bills

The first seven sections of Article I describe Congress itself: who holds the legislative power, how members are chosen, what qualifies them to serve, how each chamber runs its business, what protects members from being hauled into court for their speeches, and how a bill becomes a law. These are structural clauses. They rarely injure a particular person in a way a court can fix, which is why many of them waited a long time for a first case, and some still have not had one.

Constitutional text is from the National Archives transcription.

Section 1: The legislative power and the nondelegation question

"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 1

If all legislative power belongs to Congress, can Congress let the President or an agency fill in the details? This is the nondelegation question, and it has been argued since the early republic.

The Brig Aurora (1813): a law that turns on when the President says so

Congress had let earlier restrictions on British trade lapse, then passed an 1810 law that would revive them if the President found and proclaimed that France had stopped violating American neutral commerce. A presidential proclamation followed on November 2, 1810. Goods on the brig Aurora were seized as illegal British imports, and the claimant argued that letting a presidential proclamation revive a law was an unconstitutional transfer of legislative power.

In Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813), Justice William Johnson wrote for the Court that "we can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct." The Constitution Annotated treats the case as the starting point for "contingent legislation," laws that take effect when the executive finds certain facts. It is the earliest Supreme Court case on delegation we found.

Wayman v. Southard (1825): filling up the details

The question came back when Congress let federal courts set some of their own procedures. In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), Chief Justice John Marshall drew a line that courts still cite. It "will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself." Marshall distinguished "those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself," from "those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details."

J.W. Hampton (1928) and the intelligible principle

A century later, the Court gave the test its modern name. In J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), Chief Justice William Howard Taft upheld a law letting the President adjust tariff rates. "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."

Panama Refining and Schechter (1935): the first strike-downs

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, decided January 7, 1935, is generally cited as the first case in which the Court struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds; the Constitution Annotated treats it and Schechter as the two 1935 delegations the Court struck down. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for an 8 to 1 Court, holding that a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act let the President ban interstate shipment of "hot oil" without any standard to guide him. Justice Benjamin Cardozo dissented.

Months later, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the "sick chicken case" from a Brooklyn slaughterhouse, the Court unanimously struck down the act's code-making system. Cardozo agreed, writing that the delegated power "is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."

The Constitution Annotated states that "Since 1935, the Court has not struck down a delegation to an administrative agency." It notes one later case of a different kind: a year later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936), the Court invalidated a delegation to private parties. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the Court upholding the Clean Air Act's air quality standards. Most recently, in FCC v. Consumers' Research, decided June 27, 2025, the Court voted 6 to 3, in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, that the Universal Service Fund did not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito (see this summary of the decision). The intelligible principle test remains the law.

Section 2: The House of Representatives

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2

"By the People": Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)

For most of the country's history, courts stayed out of how states drew congressional districts. Georgia's Fifth District, which included Fulton, DeKalb and Rockdale Counties, had 823,680 people in the 1960 census, more than double the state's average district of 394,312. Voters there sued. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), Justice Hugo Black wrote for the Court that the command that representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means "as nearly as is practicable, one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Wesberry is the leading case for equal population in congressional districts.

Qualifications: Powell v. McCormack (1969)

"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2

Adam Clayton Powell Jr. of New York was re-elected to the House in 1966 amid allegations that he had misused travel funds and paid his wife a salary for work she did not do. In March 1967 the House voted 307 to 116 to exclude him and declare his seat vacant. Powell and 13 voters sued.

In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, decided June 16, 1969, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for a 7 to 1 Court. As the official syllabus summarizes the holding, in judging qualifications Congress "is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution": age, citizenship and residence. Powell met all three, so the House could not exclude him. Justice Potter Stewart dissented on the ground that the case was moot because Powell had been re-elected and seated in 1969.

Term limits: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995)

In the early 1990s, many states adopted term limits for their members of Congress. Arkansas amended its constitution to keep a House member who had served three terms, or a senator who had served two, off the general election ballot. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, decided May 22, 1995, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for a 5 to 4 Court that the qualifications for Congress are fixed, and that states cannot add to them any more than Congress can. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia.

Section 3: The Senate

"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 3

The Senate qualifications clause was the other half of Thornton, which covered the Arkansas limits on senators as well as representatives. Election of senators by state legislatures ended with the Seventeenth Amendment, covered in the final module, and impeachment trials are covered in the Article II module.

Section 4: Elections and meetings

"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 4

Federal law placed federal supervisors of election and deputy marshals at the polls in congressional elections. Several Baltimore election judges, appointed under state law, were convicted in federal court of interfering with those officials. They argued Congress had no power to make such laws. In Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), Justice Joseph Bradley wrote for the Court upholding the federal laws as a valid use of Congress's power to "make or alter" state election regulations. Siebold is an early leading case on the Elections Clause.

Section 5: Each chamber's own rules

United States v. Ballin (1892): counting a quorum

In 1890 the House adopted a rule letting the Speaker count members who were present but refused to vote when deciding whether a quorum existed. A tariff law passed under that rule was challenged as never validly enacted. In United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), Justice David Brewer wrote for the Court upholding the rule. As the official syllabus puts it, the rule was "a constitutional mode of ascertaining the presence of a quorum." Ballin remains the leading case on how much freedom each house has to write its own rules.

Section 6: Pay, privileges and the Speech or Debate Clause

"They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 6

Kilbourn v. Thompson (1881): the first Speech or Debate case

In the 1870s the House investigated the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Company. Hallet Kilbourn was subpoenaed, refused to answer questions or produce records, and was jailed by the House's Sergeant at Arms, John G. Thompson, on a House contempt order. When he got out, Kilbourn sued Thompson and the House members who voted for his arrest for false imprisonment.

In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), Justice Samuel Miller wrote for the Court. The House had no power to punish Kilbourn for contempt in that inquiry, so the Sergeant at Arms could be held liable. But the members themselves were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, which the Court read to cover more than words in debate: "things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." A Congressional Research Service report describes Kilbourn as the Supreme Court's "first decision interpreting the Clause." The Court drew on an earlier Massachusetts case, Coffin v. Coffin (1808), interpreting a similar clause in that state's constitution.

What came after

In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), the Court held that the clause barred prosecutors from building a conspiracy charge against a former congressman around a speech he gave on the House floor. In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), which arose from Senator Mike Gravel reading the Pentagon Papers into a subcommittee record, the Court held that the protection extends to a member's aides for legislative acts, but does not cover arranging private publication outside Congress.

Section 7: How a bill becomes a law

The Origination Clause: Twin City Bank (1897) and Munoz-Flores (1990)

"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7

In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897), Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote for the Court that a tax on national bank notes, part of a law setting up a national currency, was not a "bill for raising revenue" in the constitutional sense. The Constitution Annotated treats it as an early leading case. Its approach, asking whether raising revenue is the bill's main purpose, still governs.

For a long time it was unclear whether courts would hear Origination Clause claims at all. In United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990), Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the Court that such a claim is not a "political question" that courts must avoid. But the Court held that the law requiring "special assessments" from people convicted of federal misdemeanors was not a revenue bill, because they funded a specific crime victims program. We found no Supreme Court decision striking down a law under the Origination Clause.

Presentment: INS v. Chadha (1983)

Jagdish Rai Chadha, born in Kenya and holding a British passport, came to the United States on a student visa in 1966 and stayed after it expired. An immigration judge suspended his deportation. Under the immigration law, either house of Congress could veto such a suspension by simple resolution. The House passed such a resolution, and Chadha was ordered deported.

In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, decided June 23, 1983, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the Court, joined by five justices, with Justice Lewis Powell concurring in the judgment, that the one-house veto was unconstitutional. The House's action was legislative in effect, so it had to pass both houses and go to the President. Burger wrote that the Constitution's lawmaking steps reflect "a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure." Justice Byron White dissented, warning that the ruling "sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions" with legislative vetoes. Justice William Rehnquist also dissented.

The line item veto: Clinton v. City of New York (1998)

In 1996 Congress gave the President power to cancel individual spending items and certain tax benefits after signing a bill. President Clinton used it in 1997. One cancellation hit a tax provision that would have helped Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., a cooperative formed in May 1997 to help Idaho potato farmers buy processing plants. The cooperative and one of its members sued, alongside New York City and health care groups hurt by a separate cancellation.

In Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, decided June 25, 1998, Justice Stevens wrote for a 6 to 3 Court. The cancellations, "in both legal and practical effect," amended two Acts of Congress by repealing part of each, and the Constitution gives the President no power to amend or repeal a law on his own. Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Stephen Breyer dissented in part.

The pocket veto: The Pocket Veto Case (1929) and Wright (1938)

"If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law."

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7

In 1926 Congress passed a bill letting several Indian tribes of Washington State sue in the Court of Claims over lost tribal lands. President Coolidge received it on June 24, 1926. Congress adjourned its session on July 3, before the ten days ran out, and the President neither signed nor returned it. The tribes sued anyway, arguing the bill had become law. In The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929), formally Okanogan Indians v. United States, Justice Edward Sanford wrote for a unanimous Court that the adjournment between sessions prevented the bill's return, so it did not become law. The opinion noted that "there has been no decision of this Court dealing directly with its meaning and effect in respect to the precise question here involved," which makes this the Court's first ruling on that pocket veto question.

Nine years later the Court limited that holding. In Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938), the Senate alone had recessed for three days while the House stayed in session. The President returned a bill with his objections to the Secretary of the Senate during the recess. Chief Justice Hughes wrote that "the Congress" means both houses together, that a short recess of one house did not prevent the return, and that the veto was valid.

Summary of firsts in this module

Clause	First case	Year	What kind of first
Art. I, Sec. 1, legislative power (delegation)	Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382	1813	Earliest Supreme Court delegation case we found (law upheld)
Art. I, Sec. 1, legislative power (delegation)	Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388	1935	Generally cited as the first statute struck down on nondelegation grounds
Art. I, Sec. 2, chosen "by the People"	Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1	1964	Leading case requiring equal population in congressional districts
Art. I, Sec. 2 and Sec. 5, House qualifications	Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486	1969	House may not add qualifications; exclusion of a qualified member voided
Art. I, Sec. 2 and Sec. 3, qualifications and the states	U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779	1995	States may not add qualifications (congressional term limits struck down)
Art. I, Sec. 4, Elections Clause	Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371	1879	Early leading case upholding federal election laws
Art. I, Sec. 5, quorum and rules	United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1	1892	Leading case on each house's power over its own rules
Art. I, Sec. 6, Speech or Debate	Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168	1881	First Supreme Court decision interpreting the clause
Art. I, Sec. 7, Origination Clause	Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196	1897	Early leading case defining a revenue bill
Art. I, Sec. 7, presentment	INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919	1983	One-house legislative veto struck down
Art. I, Sec. 7, presentment	Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417	1998	Line Item Veto Act struck down
Art. I, Sec. 7, pocket veto	The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655	1929	First Supreme Court decision dealing directly with the clause, per the opinion